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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
receive the State Police officer's testimony that six weeks before the arrest he
observed the satisfactory performance of his speedometer as compared with a
master speedometer in a test made by an employee of a service station where
State Police cars were customarily so checked, and the County Court's conclusion
that such receipt was error53 must be rejected. Consequently it was also reversible
error for the County Court to find that the trial court's finding of guilt was against
the weight of evidence, since the County Court reached this conclusion with the
evidence of the speedometer testing erroneously excluded from its consideration.
The law in New York as it now stands would seem to be as follows: (1)
Evidence of the reading of an untested speedometer is admissible, but by itself
will probably be found insufficient to sustain a conviction for speeding. (2) Such
evidence coupled with a coinciding independent estimate of the defendant's speed
made by an officer qualified to judge speed may be sufficient to sustain a conviction. (3) Evidence as to the testing of a speedometer even by an agency outside
the police department and without the testimony of the person who conducted
the test is admissible as long as the witness observed the test.

Receipt Of Bribes By Labor Representafive
Section 380 (2) of the New York Penal Law 54 relating to the acceptance
of bribes by a labor representative was recently considered by the Court of Appeals
5
in People v. Cilento.1
In this case a labor representative was indicted for allegedly
accepting a bribe while acting in the capacity of trustee of the union welfare fund.
The Court reinstated the indictment after it was dismissed by the lower courts. 56
As pointed out by the Appellate Division 57 there generally is a valid distinction between the positions of trustee and labor representative, so that no question
arises as to whether section 380 (2) of the Penal Law applies. The problem arises
when the two positions are combined in the same person. In construing the section,
the Court of Appeals held that the term "labor representative" was not to be
considered generically but was to be interpreted in a broader sense to include any
duty imposed on a labor representative. The Court reasoned that where the constitution of a union provides that a certain labor representative solely by virtue
53. People v. Marsellus, 4 Misc.2d 211, 157 N.Y.S.2d 148 (County Ct. 1956).
54. N.Y. PENAL LAW §380(2)'provides:
Any duly appointed representative of a labor organization
who solicits or accepts . . . any thing of value . . . that he
shall be influenced In respect to any of his duties . . . is

guilty of a misdemeanor.
55. 2 N.Y.2d 55, 156 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1956).
56. 207 Misc. 914, 143 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Gen. Sess. 1955); 1 A.D.2d 206, 149
N.Y.S.2d 14 (1st Dep't 1956).
57. 1 A.D.2d 206, 149 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1st Dep't 1956).
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of his official position shall be a trustee of the union's welfare fund, the two positions may not be separated. Consequently a violation of one of his duties in the
area of trusteeship is at the same time and by the same act a violation of his duty
in the overall area as labor representative. Therefore, the acceptance of a bribe in
the capacity of trustee alleges a violation of section 380 (2) of the Penal Law
which makes it a misdemeanor to accept a bribe as a labor representative. (Emphasis supplied).
A further question was raised by the subsequent amendment of that section
which enlarged its application to include "Labor representative or any duly appointed trustee ... of an employee's welfare fund." The Court held that this later
amendment did' not indicate that the legislature never intended the original section
to apply to a labor representative who simultaneously held a position as trustee.
But rather it was a legislative attempt to cover those trustees who held their positions independent of being a labor representative.
It is apparent that the Court, in construing the term "labor representative" to
include those acts performed as a trustee, has broadly construed this statute in
derogation of the rule of construction that a criminal statute should be strictly
construed in favor of the defendant.5 8 The only justification for this decision seems
to be the slim technicality that the union constitution combined the two positions
in the same person. Therefore, in light of the subsequent amendment, the writer
feels that this case should be limited to its facts.
Criminal Confempt
The granting of statutory immunity to a witness by a grand jury does not
preclude prosecution for contempt for failure to answer questions properly within
the scope of its investigation."9 Nor is prosecution for contempt barred, after
immunity is granted, because the witness refused to answer questions on the
grounds his answers might tend to incriminate him. 0
In People v. Saperston0 l the defendant was convicted of contempt for refusing
to reveal to a grand jury, while under statutory immunity, the identity of persons
in wire tapped conversations he had with said persons. The defendant contended
that although the statutory immunity protected him from prosecution by the state,
it did not prevent federal prosecution under the Federal Communication Act," '-'
58. People v. Bene, 288 N.Y. 318, 43 N.E.2d 61 (1942).
59. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§600, 2447.
60. People v. Breslin, 306 N.Y. 294, 118 N.E.2d 108 (1954).
61. 2 N.Y.2d 210, 159 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1957).
62. 48 STAT. 1103, 47 U.S.C.A. §605 (1934).

